The Changing of the Guards
Ireland. This time, however, the plurality electoral system almost wiped out the party's MPs. The UUP was left with one junior-ranked MP. But this swing in fortunes was not just an aberration produced by SMP. The DUP has been the leading unionist party in four successive elections (2003) (2004) (2005) , under proportional election systems as well as SMP. The displacement of the historically leading party has been very similar among Northern nationalists. Sinn Féin has now out-paced the more moderate Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) in six successive elections ).
This was not what was supposed to happen. There had been a widespread expectation that the SDLP, as the principal architect of the 1998 Good Friday or Belfast Agreement, and the UUP, its 'partner in peace', would receive electoral rewards for reaching a historic compromise. Their leaders did win the Nobel peace prize, but no comparable electoral prizes came from the voters. The SDLP and UUP's negotiation of a historic compromise was widely held to presage a new era of internal power-sharing government and cooperative North-South relationships that would offer a brighter future for all in Northern Ireland. But, to date, the institutions negotiated in the Good Friday Agreement have spent more time in suspended animation than in active duty. Though the institutions have not (yet) worked as intended, the 'peace process' and the Belfast Agreement (hereafter, the 'Agreement') have transformed Northern Ireland's party system and voting behaviour.
Evaluating the prospects for an enduring settlement is not the main concern of this article 1 .
This article instead seeks to explain the transformation of the party system and the underlying shifts in patterns of voting. The argument is developed in six sections. Section 1 examines the logic of party competition in ethnic party systems. It examines the implications of the ethnic outbidding thesis, and considers how ethnic party systems may be rescued from their predicted centrifugal fate. A combination of Downsian vote-seeking motivations (within a bi-polar segmented electorate) and the incentives of power-sharing institutions may encourage the development of electoral strategies based on what we call ethnic tribune appeals. Section 2 examines the survey evidence of the Northern
Ireland Election Studies which shows direct vote switches from the more moderate to the more extreme parties. Direct vote-switching from the moderate parties to the ostensibly 'extreme' parties is prima facie consistent with the outbidding thesis, but we argue that their gains are mostly explained by their increased moderation combined with their 'ethnic tribune' appeal. Section 3 analyses whether popular attitudes on some of the major principles of the Good Friday Agreement have in fact converged or polarised. If the out-bidding thesis is correct, increased electoral support for more extreme parties should be accompanied by increasing attitudinal polarization among voters on these
principles. But we demonstrate striking evidence of attitudinal convergence. This presents a puzzle.
Why do we see inter-ethnic attitudinal convergence on more moderate policy positions at the same time that we witness dramatically increased support for the more extreme parties? Sections 4 and 5 confront this puzzle. Section 4 presents evidence of the parties, especially the DUP and Sinn Féin, competing and being rewarded on the basis of 'ethnic tribune appeals'. Section 5 subjects this thesis to some stringent tests by estimating multivariate models that control for other factors known to be strong predictors of party support. In Section 6 we discuss the general implications of our findings for the ethnic outbidding thesis. (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972: 86) .
Section 1: The Logic of Party Competition in Ethnic Party Systems
Once an ethnic party system is extensively mobilised it is made up primarily of 'ethnic parties' 2 that appeal almost exclusively to voters from their own ethnic group rather than as in non-segmented societies (at least aspirationally) to all voters. Their mobilisation drives are 'catch-us' rather than 'catch-all'. Loyalties may have a strongly ascriptive character so that few voters 'float across' the primary political cleavage derived from the clash of ethnic identities. Elections resemble ethnic 'headcounts' or censuses. Party platforms tend to be characterised by ethnic outbidding among rival parties within each ethnic bloc (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972, Horowitz 1985: 349-60 'From time to time, moderates appear in the electoral arena of plural societies but usually fail to retain long-run support from their constituents. Extremist entrepreneurs resort to ethnic demand generation and moderates are often compelled to adopt a less compromising stance to avoid defeat'. Thus the out-bidding thesis predicts that the one thing that inter-ethnic centripetal moves are almost certain to accomplish is to launch Phase 2 of the ethnic party system, namely the institutionalisation of intraethnic competition (see Horowitz 1985: 354-60) .
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In the older literature on ethnic party systems and democratisation earlier pre-independence stages of party development were analysed. The terminal stages of colonial rule incentivised the maintenance of independence parties with (at least some) multi-ethnic support (e.g. Horowitz 1985: 309) . But post-independence, the multi-ethnic party or coalition is unstable, as the 'national' conflict against the colonial power loses salience and is replaced by intense distributive conflicts, led by ethnic entrepreneurs engaged in what Sartori calls the 'unfair competition' of out-bidding (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972: 82) . But we are concerned with the dynamics of ethnic party competition once such a system has emerged, rather than on its genesis.
In Phase 2 the accommodating centripetal moves of the dominant ethnic parties render them vulnerable to counter-mobilizations within their own segments by self-styled hard-line 'saviours' of their cause. The once dominant ethnic parties can no longer claim to speak unequivocally for their communities. They now have more intransigent intra-ethnic rivals mobilizing in their heartlands, threatening to denounce any further cooperative moves as 'betrayals' or 'capitulations'. Given that the costs of inter-ethnic concessions tend to be tangible and immediate (lost resources, symbols, or securities), whereas the benefits may be more elusive and future-oriented (peace, prosperity, or inward investment), in protracted conflicts the structure of incentives may be stacked in favour of the intransigent rather than the more moderate parties. The outcome is all too familiar. The party system increases in size and bargaining complexity, and the incentives and security of leaders to engage in meaningful compromises are severely undermined (Nordlinger 1972) . Settlements are less likely to be attempted, become harder to reach, and if struck, are less likely to be stable. Indeed, Rabushka and Shepsle (1972: 86) despairingly reason that 'democracy in plural societies is a casualty of communal politics', so that ethnic conflict resolution is not manageable within a democratic framework (ibid:
But what happens next? Grofman and Stockwell (2003:137) correctly point out that a weakness of the 'plural society theory is that it predicts only one outcome: instability and the end of democratic rule. Therefore, plural society theory cannot explain successful democracy outcomes'.
What are the implications for levels of polarization and the direction of party competition if there is an ethnic party system? Is there only one outcome? Perhaps intra-ethnic competition continues indefinitely and precludes progress, giving us a stalemated system, with minor intra-ethnic swings. Or perhaps the more extreme parties outflank and replace the once dominant parties, returning the party system essentially back to phase 1. That would then create the possibility of a repeat cycle. This cycle of former ethnic radicals moderating their stance, only to be attacked and displaced in their turn by newcomers who repeat the original transformation they denounced, would be reminiscent of Roberto Michels' prediction in his Political Parties (1911) that the cruel game of leadership betrayal and replacement would continue without end.
The conventional prognosis, embedded in Rabushka and Shepsle's work, is that the centrifugal competitive dynamic of ethnic out-bidding leads to ever increasing polarisation between the communities so that little or no cooperative progress is feasible: Sri Lanka from the 1950s exemplifies the story. Fierce intra-ethnic competition is clearly a serious constraint on conflictregulating endeavours. But it does not necessarily follow that the 'moderate ground' will be vacated by the main parties and that all electoral competition will therefore be relentlessly centrifugal. After all, it is only electorally rational for all or most of the main parties in each segment to move permanently to the extremes of ethnic intransigence if they believe that this is where most of the voters are permanently located. They would have to believe there is an extreme bi-modal distribution of voter preferences that becomes progressively ever more extreme. In such cases Downs predicted 'a reign of terror ' and revolution (1957: 120) . In ethnic conflicts, the operationalization of the 'reign of terror' would include the establishment of control systems, or inter-ethnic wars, or contested secession. Such outcomes are not rare. But equally, they are not as inevitable as the out-bidding thesis predicts.
Centripetal Dynamics in Ethnic Party Systems?
In principle there are a variety of means through which ethnic party systems may avoid the centrifugal fate predicted by the outbidding model 4 . First a multidimensional cross-cutting cleavage structure may permit enough 'fluidity' in ethnic relations to prevent the polarising consequences of a permanent 'minority-majority' structure. Second, even in the absence of substantial cross-cutting cleavages, the adoption of power-sharing institutions may lead to centripetal competition according to 4 We do not provide a full taxonomy of possible conflict-regulating elements in party systems, but rather focus on those relevant to the present case.
a Downsian logic, amended to take account of bipolar preferences. We examine each of these possibilities in turn. (Roeder 2005: 56) . While this is not the place for a full evaluation of this approach it is worth noting that the power-dividing strategy is essentially an alternative means (an alternative to cross-cutting cleavages) of encouraging a multiple majorities strategy for de-escalating conflict (Roeder 2005:61 (Tilley, Evans and Mitchell, typescript) . Very few voters are not committed to one bloc or the other, so there have been few electoral incentives to be moderate.
But reflection should suggest that in many ethnic party systems, as in contemporary Northern
Ireland, the goal of many rational voters will be to avoid a reign of terror, to avoid tyrannous majority control, violently contested secession, violent irredentism or repressive down-sizing, especially if any or all of these outcomes appear likely to be extremely costly. In Northern Ireland large and increasing proportions of voters want to see power-sharing across the British unionist-Irish nationalist divide, but without the need to abandon their ethno-national identities and aspirations. The 1998 Agreement, and its treaty form, the British-Irish Agreement ('the Agreement') institutionalised a set of power-sharing institutions and federal and con-federal arrangements that mandate that (a)
executive power can only be devolved to the local parties if it is shared across both nationalities, and (b) make both ethno-national groups long-term constitutional preferences legitimate (O'Leary, 1999).
To take just one example: in forming a Northern Ireland Executive (the name for the power-sharing government), the Agreement provided a sequential portfolio allocation procedure which meant that This logic might not hold if the formerly extreme parties anticipate that their centripetal moves will result in flanking by new entrants.
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We are not arguing that the 1998 Agreement is the origin or the only cause of centripetal moves by Sinn Féin and the DUP. We discuss the timing of these moves below. propose it, but they were not the key executive officers of the Republic; the two consuls were (Taylor 1949 ). The concept of a 'tribune party' was used by Lavau (1969; 1975) to characterise the French Communist Party, a party that continued 'to play the part of tribune, laying stress on its defensive role' (Johnson, 1981: 151) . Our term 'ethnic tribune party' combines the traditional expressive feature of tribune politics (the most robust defender of the cause) with an emphasis that such a party can seek to maximise the ethnic group's share of resources extractable from political participation.
The ethnic tribune party can be simultaneously pragmatic (with regard to resources) and intransigent (with regard to identity). In short, ethnic party systems, just like non-ethnic party systems, may contain both centripetal and centrifugal dynamics (Adams, Merrill and Grofman 2005) . Large sections of Northern Irish voters want peace and cooperation without abandoning their ethno-national identities. That is not irrational or logically contradictory. Essentially, each community wants its 'strongest voice' to represent it, but sections of each community wants this ethnic champion to act in a more cooperative fashion, or at least in a less 'anti-system' or 'rejectionist' manner. Voting for ethnic tribune parties implies a certain level of intransigence in advocating the ethnic groups'
interests, but does not necessarily entail the increased overall polarisation implied by outbidding models.
Ethnic Tribune Parties: Success with Moderated Platforms
Provisional Sinn Féin began its life as an abstentionist protest party, refusing to recognize the state, and encouraging its supporters not to vote. Its entry into the electoral arena followed the unplanned success of hunger-striking political prisoners in winning votes and seats in both parts of Ireland in 1980-1. Following its first electoral contest and breakthrough in 1982, Sinn Féin's vote essentially flat-lined at around 11 per cent, its average performance during the ten elections between 1982-1994 (i.e. the elections before the IRA's ceasefire), though it rose before and fell after the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 (see Table 1 ).
[ Table 1 and Figure There is some evidence that much of Sinn Féin's early electoral growth (in the 1980s and early 1990s) was achieved by mobilising nationalist non-voters and new age cohorts rather than by directly winning over SDLP partisans (O'Leary 1990; McAllister 2004; Mitchell 1999; Tonge 2005) .
The 1994 IRA cessation of its armed campaign was clearly the catalyst for Sinn Féin's renewed electoral advances. The ceasefire, Sinn Féin's de facto acceptance of the 'consent principle' (that Irish re-unification requires the consent of majorities in both Irish jurisdictions), and later its enthusiastic participation in all of the Agreement's institutions, rendered the party much more acceptable and attractive to wider groups of nationalist voters. Sinn Féin's vote immediately jumped at the first postceasefire election in 1996 (see figure 2), and has followed a consistently upward trajectory ever since.
The peace process has clearly been the handmaiden of Sinn Féin's electoral growth; its incorporation into 'ordinary politics' has undermined the distinctiveness of the SDLP's strategic position as the 'acceptable face' of nationalist politics, and its principal bargaining actor. At elections since 1996 the SDLP has been losing an average of 0.4 per cent per election, whereas Sinn Féin has been gaining 1.2 per cent at each election. Sustained over a decade the net changes have amounted to an almost complete reversal of fortunes (see table 1 Thus, before the onset of the 'peace process' and the Agreement, both of the more extreme parties discovered real limits to their electoral growth. They were important electoral niche players, to be sure, but not the dominant parties in their respective blocs that they aspired to become. The DUP was primarily a defensive 'ethnic tribune party', a party of protest that was simultaneously pragmatic Tables 2a and 2b present evidence of direct vote-switching between the principal parties both before and after the Agreement.
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10 Unfortunately no panel-study data is available for Northern Ireland; we are therefore restricted to cross-sectional analyses. Assembly election, compared to their recalled vote in the 1996 Forum election. Among unionists (see Table 2a ) between 1996 and 1998 there was very little net gain from direct switches between the UUP and DUP. Each party lost 13 per cent of its 1996 vote directly to its main rival (though given that the UUP was the larger party at this time its losses to the DUP were greater than vice versa; compare the cell figures for total %). The DUP vote appeared more 'solid', it retained 80 per cent of its 1996 voters, whereas the UUP managed to hold on to only 68 per cent of its 1996 voters. Indeed in 1998 the biggest UUP losses were to small unionist parties and independent unionists. In 1998 the UUP [ Table 2b 
Section 3: Converging Attitudes to the Agreement Since 1998
The full implementation of the Agreement was already stalled when the second election to the Northern Ireland Assembly was eventually held in November 2003. 13 The dual premiership had and expectations, some of its core features are contained in the survey questions reported in Table 3 .
The same questions were asked in 1998 and again in 2003.
[ Table 3 about here]
On the first two questions in Table 3 A defining feature of any consociational political arrangement is the need for significant sections of the main protagonists to be willing to share power. It is thus encouraging that the most dramatic shift of opinion revealed in Table 3 Table 4 are striking.
[ Table 4 
Section 5: Testing the Ethnic Tribune Voting Thesis
Separate models predicting voting for Sinn Féin among Catholic voters (Table 5 ) and voting for the DUP among Protestant voters (Table 6) Before examining the models we should note that estimating party support in Northern
Ireland has always been somewhat problematic, given that some respondents tend to claim to be more moderate than they really are (e.g. This basic pattern of SDLP supporters being more content with the status quo and less likely to believe that a united Ireland is a serious prospect is repeated across a wide range of survey questions.
While both nationalist parties are overwhelmingly in favour of the Belfast Agreement, SDLP supporters are much more willing to take the view that some of its details could benefit from renegotiation, whereas Sinn Féin partisans agree with what has become the mantra of their leaders:
'the Agreement is right and just needs to be implemented in full'
[ Table 5 about here]
Model 1 shows Sinn Féin voters are much more likely to be generally dissatisfied with democracy in Northern Ireland (indeed this variable remains significant in all of our models). They are also much more likely to subscribe to an 'Irish' identity, than a 'Northern Irish', 'Ulster' or 'British' identity. Reform of policing has been and remains a highly emotive issue in Northern Ireland, and Sinn Féin voters believe that police reform has 'not gone far enough'. They also believe It might reasonably be expected that the unionist ethnic tribune variable ('DUP the most effective voice for unionists') will have an even stronger effect than its nationalist analogue given that divisions among the unionist parties in 2003 were fiercer than among nationalists. After all although we have seen in Table 4 that most nationalists viewed Sinn Fein as the more effective voice for nationalists, few believed that the SDLP had 'sold-out' the ethno-national cause. By contrast the DUP has consistently alleged that the UUP was engaged in protracted capitulation to the Irish Republican movement.
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[ Table 6 Thus even when subjected to demanding multivariate controls the evidence is consistent with the argument that ethnic tribune appeals contribute significantly to the new found dominance of the DUP and Sinn Féin.
Section 6: Discussion and Conclusion
Once an ethnic party system is fully mobilised the outbidding thesis predicts a contagion of extremist politics which destabilises and ultimately prevents ethnic conflict regulation within a democratic framework (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972) . In Northern Ireland, it is clear that both of the ostensibly Our answer is that while most voters want peace and power-sharing they simultaneously also want their strongest tribune to protect their ethno-national interests. Identity voting for ethnic tribune parties -a kind of ethnic valence appeal -implies a certain level of intransigence in advocating the ethnic group's interests, but does not necessarily entail the increased overall polarisation implied by outbidding models. Electoral strategies based on 'ethnic tribune appeals' combine the traditional expressive feature of tribune politics (the most robust defender of the cause) with a concern to maximise the ethnic group's share of political resources that can be derived from on-going interethnic negotiations and policy implementation. Thus the ethnic tribune party can be simultaneously pragmatic (with regard to resources) and intransigent (with regard to identity), so that ethnic party systems, just like non-ethnic party systems, contain both centripetal and centrifugal dynamics.
The out-bidding models derived from plural society theory correctly suggest that democratic stability is much more difficult to achieve in divided societies with fully mobilised ethnic party systems. But they are not correct when they predict that ethnic party systems inevitably lead to perpetual extremist outbidding that in turn leads to inevitable democratic collapse. There are some With appropriate power-sharing institutions even ethnic parties can derive electoral rewards by competing on more moderate platforms, providing they can develop an 'ethnic tribune appeal', that is the perception that they most effectively represent their groups ethno-national interests.
Therefore, out-bidding models may predict incorrectly. Of course, consociation requires that successful ethnic tribune parties must become willing to become parties of government, to take the joint premiership, in other words, to become the consuls. In Northern Ireland Sinn Féin is clearly willing to take one consulate, it remains to be seen whether the Democratic Unionist Party is willing to take the other: it has indicated conditions under which it may do so.
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Figure 1 to 'not at all satisfied'; Irish identity: coded 1= 'Irish', 0= 'British', 'Northern Irish' or 'Ulster'; power-sharing: 'the experience of power-sharing has meant that one day a majority of unionists will agree to Northern Ireland joining the Irish Republic', coded on five point scale 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree'; police reform: a categorical variable asking 'do you think that reform of the police in Northern Ireland has gone too far, has not gone far enough, or is about right'; How much Say: 'how much say do you think a Westminster government of any party should have in the way Northern Ireland is run? Coded on a four point scale from 'a great deal of say' to 'no say at all'. SF most effective: 'Which party do you think has been the most effective voice for unionists in Northern Ireland'. The Vote 1998 variables are coded (0, other; 1, SF), and refer to the NI Assembly election of 1998). The Trust variables are coded (0, no; 1, yes) to the questions 'Here is a list of some of the main political leaders in Northern Ireland. Which of them, if any, would you generally trust to act in the best interests of all the people in Northern Ireland'. Source: The 2003 Northern Ireland Election Study, funded by the UK's ESRC. Notes: Logistic regression as in Table 5 . Voting for DUP is coded as 1, Others as 0. Results columns show logit coefficients (their standard errors) and the exact P-Value. For convenience asterisks highlight: significance at *p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Variables and codings: GFA: Which is closest to your own opinion of the Agreement? (1, 'The Agreement is basically right and just needs to be implemented in full'; 2, ''The Agreement is basically right but the specifics need to be renegotiated'; 3; 'The Agreement is basically wrong and needs to be abandoned or renegotiated'). Nationalists UK: 'The experience of power-sharing has meant that nationalists are now more content that Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK' (1, disagree/strongly disagree; 2, neither; 3, agree/strongly agree). Schools: 'If you were deciding where to send your children to school, would you prefer a school with children of only your own religion, or a mixed-religion school? Police reform: 'Do you think that the reform of the police in Northern Ireland has gone too far, has not gone far enough, or is it about right? Role of IRL govt: 'How much say do you think an Irish government of any party should have in the way Northern Ireland is run? The other variables, SF most effective, Vote 1998 and the 'trust' variables are coded in the same manner as in Table 5 . Source: The 2003 Northern Ireland Election Study, funded by the UK's ESRC.
